The 1971 War

Author: Brigadier Mohammad Yasin (Retired)

In 1970, a modern wireless link between East and West Pakistan was planned. The USA was to fund the project. It was to be a state-of-the-art link connecting the two wings of the country. The GHQ Signals Directorate had me posted to the GHQ Signal Battalion as the Project Officer. The exercise started in earnest, and a few meetings were held with the US Company that won the project through due process. Unfortunately, the project could not take off because of the uncertain and unstable conditions in East Pakistan.

From the very beginning of 1971, East Pakistan was in turmoil. Mujibur Rehman, the head of Awami League, had launched his six points, which virtually meant separation of the Eastern Wing. He had full Indian support.

The situation, which should have been amicably handled, was grossly mishandled by the Pakistan Government. The Awami Leagues under the patronage of the Indian Army organized a military wing of the party, the Mukti Bihini. By September 1971, Mukti Bihini, supported by the Indian Army, started a guerrilla war against the Pakistan Army. In early December, the Indian Army launched a massive attack on East Pakistan.

As the Communication Officer in GHQ, I was responsible for ensuring that there was nonstop communication with the forward formations in West Pakistan and with army formations in East Pakistan.

At that time, the only mode of communication we had with East Pakistan was with a 10kW transmitter. I foresaw that the Indian Army would knock out our transmitters through an air attack. I had a few transmitters relocated from the main building to a make-shift underground arrangement to ensure continuous communication. I had not informed the commanding officer of this move. One day, he came for an informal inspection of the transmitting station. I showed him the standby arrangement. He was very happy with the initiative and appreciated my decision.

All communication with East Pakistan was wireless. We did not have any line communication. So, the communication had to be encrypted to ensure that, on interception, it was not readily decrypted by the Indians. Often, it takes considerable time to decode an encrypted message, and to make it more difficult, the codes are often changed. But another interesting, rather unfortunate thing was that our senior officers were not very security-minded. During the 1971 war, I was asked to monitor the telephonic communication between GHQ and East Pakistan. When I submitted my report, it was not liked by the senior staff officers, and I was told to stop monitoring the calls.

The situation in East Pakistan at that time was not favourable and stable. Our fighting formations totalled only about 35,000 troops. They did not have modern weapons; we only had one squadron of the air force and no naval ships. India had banned our overflights from the West to East Pakistan. Despite these weaknesses, our fighting units effectively faced the Indian Army. Some local commanders wanted to fight to the end. However, an unclassified and unencrypted flash wireless message was sent by GHQ to Commander East Pakistan advising him to end further bloodshed and initiate negotiations to end the war. The Chief Duty Signal Officer (CDSO) was called by the C-in-C secretariat to collect that message. He informed the GHQ Signals Directorate about the message. Since it was a flash message, it was at once transmitted. The Signals Directorate was surprised and enquired if it was a genuine message. They were told that the message was collected personally by CDSO and had been transmitted since it was a flash message. Flash messages are transmitted at once. The receiving end is also informed by a flash telephone call that a message is coming. The addressee is at once informed about the expected message. Since the message was unencrypted, the Indians intercepted it and were happy. They intensified their attacks and demanded that the Commander East Pakistan must surrender. Lieutenant General Niazi decided to surrender, although most local commanders had wanted to fight till the end. He surrendered on December 17, 1971. It was a very sad and disappointing moment. A few of us even wept at that time at what happened.

The Government constituted a commission headed by Chief Justice Hamood Ur Rehman. It’s known as the Hamood Ur Rehman Commission. It was mandated to inquire into the circumstances and the reasons for the Pakistan Army’s surrender in East Pakistan. I appeared before the commission, and I recorded my statement/views on the debacle. I was a major then, and the main point that I brought out there was that our crypto equipment was destroyed by our forces in East Pakistan prematurely. When it was destroyed, we could not encrypt anything, and everything was open, which the Indian’s could very easily intercept. The Indians could break our encryption or codes, but it took time to do so. My appearance before the commission without permission from the Army was not liked, and I was warned by friends that some action might be taken against me. There was also some surveillance on me by the intelligence.

That abject surrender was a very unfortunate, sad, disappointing moment for Pakistan. We had lost half of our country. Many of us wept. I was so sad that I wrote the following poem:

O’ land O’ beautiful land, never shall you be trampled again, Sacrifices in thousands, we have not made in vain.

How can we wash the shame that your enemies have brought on you. By avenging the sorrows that they have consistently wrought on you.

I have a dream, that vindicate thy honour, we will, For every son (and daughter) of the soil shall determinedly go through the mill.

Strong and prosperous you shall be, for we will make you so, Only thy well-wishers shall stay for all others will go.

O’ land, O’ Pak land you are land of the pure, We shall not rest till all thy wounds we cure.

That abject surrender we dare not ask you to forgive, Only the assurance by thy sons (and daughters) to die for you may live. Disobey you? Who could be so disrespectful? Surely none, but the exploiters’

Disintegrate you? Who could be so ungrateful? Surely none, but the ‘conspirators. O’ land, O’ Motherland, Bread and shelter even to the saboteurs?

We salute thy greatness, But be witness to redemption pledged by thine saviours.