Why was it necessary to create a fully loaded Chief of Defence Forces position?

Author: Brigadier Mohammad Yasin (Retired)

During a war, strong and close coordination among all fighting forces is supposed to be the key to victory. History is replete with the examples when wars and battles were lost due to a lack of coordination, communication failure, and command disputes.

Prior to 1971 war with India, the tri-service coordination was nonexistent in Pakistan’s military establishment. This lack of coordination severely impacted the military operation resulting in a painful setback to Pakistan. One of the examples of lack of coordination during this war was that the Pakistan Navy (PN) was not informed about the D-Day and H-Hour when the Army and the Air Force had launched their operations. As a result, the PN could not take the initiative like it did in 1965 war when it attacked an Indian coastal installation. At that time, the Indian Navy had to go on the defensive mode and anchored its aircraft carrier in the Bombay Harbour. In 1971 war, the PN had to move its ships back to the Karachi Harbour after they suffered losses by the Indian air attacks. The three services’ chiefs operated on their own since they would report directly to the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister.

After the ceasefire, the then President of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto constituted a Commission in December 1971 to inquire into the circumstances that resulted in the Fall of Dhaka. The Commission, headed by the Chief Justice Hamoodur Rehman, pointed out the lack of jointness in the tri-service coordination and recommended the setting up of Joint Services Headquarters and the appointment of a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC). I was then serving as Communication Officer in the GHQ, Rawalpindi. When I voluntarily appeared before the Commission to record my statement, a discussion was going on between Justice Hamoodur Rehman and a General (Retired), who had been assisting the Commission at that time. Later, on the recommendations of the Commission, the then government announced the establishment of the Joint Staff (JS) Headquarters. A Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was constituted which was to be headed by a chairman, a four-star general from the Army or equivalent from the Navy or the Air Force. However, the CJCSC was not vested with any command authority over the three services. His role was confined to a Principal Military Advisor to the Government on National Security. The appointment was ceremonial and only that of a coordinator. With such a system in place, disagreements between the three services were inevitable, especially when civil-military relations were weak.

Today’s conflicts are complex. Wars are fought simultaneously over land, sea, air, cyber and space. The recent conflict with India proved that precision strikes against the enemy targets were crucial to gain advantage. This can only be achieved with effective tri-service coordination, which is paramount to responding decisively to diverse and rapidly evolving threats. Only with jointness, the armed forces can be enabled to acquire the capacity of joint planning, training and operating together. Mere coordination (as was before the 27th constitutional amendment) was a loose system that lacked efficiency and effectiveness. Coordination merged with integration brings unity of effort which is so essential for an upper hand against the adversary. Creating the position of Chief of the Defence Forces (CDF) will be instrumental in tri-service integration. Several countries having such setups are good examples. In the UK, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is the highest military appointment, the professional head of armed forces as well as the Principal Advisor to the government. The CDS is based in the Ministry of Defence and works alongside the permanent Undersecretary, the Ministry’s Senior Civil Servant. Almost similar arrangements are being practiced in Canada, India, China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Europe. In the US, the Chairperson of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for cross-service coordination and does not possess direct command. According to the US military doctrine, jointness is the key to success in military operations. There is seamless integration across all services. The system is synergetic.

In Pakistan, successive governments could not create an integrated system of defence because of political instability, poor governance and weak management as well as the upper hand of the defence establishment over civilian rule. As a result, the tri-service jointness remained ineffective. Creating the position of CDF, although a good strategic decision, is the first step in jointness. His terms of service should be laid down. For harmonious tri-service relationships, the CDF should not concurrently be the commander of the army, navy or air force. It should be a separate office. The previous CJCSC Headquarters should be upgraded to CDF Headquarters. For close coordination between the three services, deputies from the Navy and Air Force should be appointed. The system should be rotational among the three services. Most importantly, a comprehensive joint doctrine for tri-service planning and operations must be formulated. Only a strong doctrine will enable. the armed services to confront the ever-increasing dangers of future wars that will be less conventional and more of cyber based and AI assisted.

(The Writer is Distinguished Advisor Emeritus at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute Islamabad. The views expressed in this article are his own and are not related to the Institute.)